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CEO Overconfidence and Management Forecasting 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines how overconfidence affects the properties of management forecasts. Using 
both the ‘over-optimism’ and ‘miscalibration’ dimensions of overconfidence to generate our 
predictions, we examine three research questions. First, we examine whether overconfidence 
increases the likelihood of issuing a forecast. Second, we examine whether overconfidence 
increases the amount of optimism in management forecasts. Third, we examine whether 
overconfidence increases the precision of the forecast. Using both options- and press-based 
measures to proxy for individual overconfidence we find support for all three research questions.   
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1. Introduction 
Research has examined how different aspects of individual psychology affect asset prices in 
equilibrium (e.g. Kyle and Wang 1997; Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 1998; Odean 
1998; Fischer and Verrecchia 1999; Gervais and Odean 2001; Libby, Bloomfield, and Nelson 
2002). These papers use evidence in social psychology on individual decision-making as potential 
explanations for observed empirical regularities in asset prices, such as momentum or post-
earnings announcement drift. In contrast, research studying the effects of individual psychology 
and decision biases on corporate policies and executive decision-making has been sparse until 
recently. Heaton (2002) discusses this discrepancy between the literatures. He notes that the lack 
of behavioral economics in corporate decision-making research is puzzling, because the common 
objections to behavioral economics have less vitality in this setting than in asset pricing. The 
effects of individual psychology should be easier to detect in the context of corporate decisions, 
where there exists little or no arbitrage mechanism, and where significant decisions, such as 
corporate acquisitions, are relatively infrequent with delayed and noisy feedback.1  With the 
introduction of archival measures of overconfidence, recent studies have examined links between 
overconfidence and corporate decisions such as acquisitions, cash flow sensitivity, financial 
reporting, and risk taking behavior (Malmendier and Tate 2005, 2008; Ahmed and Duellman 2012; 
Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh 2012; Schrand and Zechman 2012; Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey 
2013).  
Our study examines the effect of overconfidence on management forecasting behavior 
using actual forecast data. The setting of management forecasting in which managers control (i) 
the decision to forecast, (ii) the level of the forecast, and (iii) the precision of the forecast makes it 
particularly well-suited to study the effects of overconfidence. Prior research suggests that 
                                                 
1 Roll (1986) expresses similar sentiments, arguing that managerial hubris is likely to contribute to 
corporate takeovers, because of the substantial influence of the executives in these decisions. 
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individual overconfidence has two key facets: over-optimism and miscalibration (Skala 2008; 
Libby and Rennekamp 2012).2 Over-optimism refers to individuals that are unrealistically 
optimistic about uncertain outcomes. This over-optimism has been linked to the ‘better than 
average’ effect, where individuals tend to overestimate their ability relative to average, and the 
‘illusion of control’, where individuals believe they have greater control over uncertain events and 
do not fully account for random or uncontrollable events (Larwood and Whittaker 1977). Over-
optimism is akin to an overestimation of the mean, where the overconfident individual believes 
that an uncertain outcome will be better than what would be predicted by an unbiased expectation 
(e.g. over-estimating the S&P500 expected return next year relative to historic averages). 
Miscalibration is associated with individuals underestimating uncertainty when predicting 
uncertain events. Miscalibration is therefore akin to an underestimation of the variance, leading to 
subjective probability distributions with respect to uncertain events that are set too narrowly (e.g. a 
confidence interval around the prediction of next year’s expected S&P500 return that is narrower 
than historic norms).  
Both facets of overconfidence are likely to be important in the context of management 
forecasting, where managers voluntarily issue forecasts about unknown future earnings. 
Importantly, both can be used to generate testable hypotheses related to the different aspects of 
management forecasting. We test for three potential consequences of overconfidence with respect 
to management forecasts. First, we examine whether overconfidence increases the likelihood that 
CEOs issue forecasts. Second, conditional on issuing a forecast, we examine whether 
                                                 
2 As discussed in section 2, overconfidence derives from both a stable individual trait and from 
environmental factors. For example, Libby and Rennekamp (2012) show that self-serving 
attribution resulting from variation in task difficulty -- an environmental factor – increases 
overconfidence incremental to the stable trait that they measure using standard psychometric tests. 
They further find that both manipulated self-serving attribution and stable traits related to 
overconfidence are positively related to forecast issuance. More generally, their finding highlights 
how the effect of overconfidence in a corporate decision context is a function of both the 
underlying individual overconfidence and the environmental factors surrounding the decision.  
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overconfidence is associated with a greater probability of missing forecasts, controlling for other 
determinants of forecast accuracy. Third, we examine whether overconfidence affects the 
precision of the forecast, with overconfident CEOs being more likely to issue forecasts with 
narrower ranges.  
We measure CEO overconfidence using empirical measures that have been developed in 
prior research using option-exercise behavior and popular press characterizations of the CEO (e.g. 
Malmendier and Tate 2005, 2008; Jin and Kothari 2008; Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, 
Rutherford, and Stanley 2011; Malmendier, Tate, and Yan 2011; Hirshleifer et al. 2012). Our 
primary measure of overconfidence classifies managers as overconfident if they overexpose 
themselves to the idiosyncratic risk of their firms. Following Campbell et al. (2011) and 
Hirshleifer et al. (2012), we calculate the average moneyness of the CEO’s option portfolio for 
each year and  classify CEOs as overconfident if they hold options with average moneyness of at 
least 67% more than once during our sample period. This sample includes large U.S. firms 
covered by Execucomp from 2001 to 2010. Our alternative measure of overconfidence is based on 
press portrayals of the CEO. Malmendier and Tate (2008) classify a CEO as overconfident if 
she/he is more frequently described as confident and optimistic relative to descriptors such as 
frugal, conservative, cautious, practical, reliable, or steady. This measure is hand-collected from 
press coverage of the CEO, and the sample consists of all Fortune 500 firms from 2001 through 
2007. One benefit of using this additional measure is that it provides a validation of the option-
based measure and is less susceptible to endogeneity concerns.  
Consistent with our first hypothesis, we find that overconfidence is positively associated 
with the decision to issue voluntary forecasts, although this is only significant for the press-based 
measure and the Malmendier and Tate measure computed post-2006. Consistent with our second 
hypothesis, we find that overconfident managers are more likely to issue forecasts that they 
subsequently miss, and that their forecasts have a greater optimistic bias. This holds after 
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controlling for the self-selection associated with forecasting, and after controlling for year and 
industry fixed effects, and standard firm-level predictors of managerial forecast errors. Consistent 
with our third hypothesis, we find that overconfidence affects forecast precision, measured as the 
width of the forecast when issued as a range. As a robustness check, we also use the package-level 
data on CEO option holdings available in Execucomp beginning in 2006 to replicate the 
proprietary measure used in Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) and Malmendier et al. (2011) and 
find similar results.  
Our results have important implications for managers as survey evidence suggests that 
they are concerned about setting disclosure precedents that cannot be maintained because of 
concerns with issuing unattainable forecasts (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005). If 
overconfidence leads CEOs to issue forecasts at a higher rate, and these forecasts are either too 
optimistic or too narrowly specified, this will increase the chance of missing the forecast, which 
has significant consequences for their reputation, credibility and career prospects (Hutton and 
Stocken 2009; Mergenthaler, Rajgopal, and Srinivasan 2011). Moreover, given the asymmetric 
market punishment for missed earnings forecasts documented in prior studies, it is important to 
understand additional reasons why managers might fail to meet their own projections (Soffer, 
Thiagarajan, and Walther 2000).   
Our paper contributes to several streams of literature. First, we add to the growing 
literature on the role that individual psychology plays in corporate decisions. Prior studies contend 
that overconfident CEOs are more acquisitive and over-invest in projects they perceive as less 
risky, leading to reductions in firm value in the long run (Malmendier and Tate 2005, 2008). Firms 
with overconfident CFOs also have a lower propensity to pay out dividends and a higher 
propensity to engage in market timing (Ben-David et al. 2013). Schrand and Zechman (2012) 
further suggest that overconfidence leads to greater financial misreporting. Hirshleifer et al. (2012), 
however, document a positive aspect of CEO overconfidence. Their findings suggest that 
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overconfident CEOs invest more in risky projects and achieve more innovative success. We add to 
this body of research by showing that overconfidence also affects the form and content of 
voluntary management forecasts.  
We also contribute to the literature on management forecasts and provide evidence that 
overconfidence is an important determinant of firms’ forecast properties. As Hirst, Koonce, and 
Venkataraman (2008) conclude in their review of the literature on management forecasts: 
“…managers’ choice of forecast characteristics appears to be the least understood (both in terms 
of theory and research) even though it is the component over which managers have the most 
control.” Our findings shed light on this observation and suggest that managers’ individual traits 
play a strong role in determining both forecast specificity and forecast precision, in addition to the 
decision to issue forecasts.3 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews prior literature and motivates 
our hypotheses, and Section three describes our research design. Section four presents our main 
results and Section five describes our additional sensitivity analyses. Section six summarizes our 
results and concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
                                                 
3 It is plausible that CFOs, rather than CEOs, are heavily involved in planning and developing 
forecasts and that “assortative matching” between CEO and CFO preferences would provide us 
with similar results. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that CEOs are more likely to have the 
final say, as they are often the ones subject to public backlash for missing previously issued 
guidance. In fact, CEOs are commonly at blame when firms fail to meet their previously issued 
forecasts. See Jackson, E., April 29th, 2011, “What I would ask Jim Balsillie of Research in 
Motion this morning,” Forbes (http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericjackson/2011/04/29/what-i-would-
ask-jim-balsillie-of-rim-this-morning/) and Boorstin, J.,  October 24th, 2011, “Netflix investors 
don’t buy CEO’s long view,” CNBC 
(http://www.cnbc.com/id/45023075/Netflix_Investors_Don_t_Buy_CEO_s_Long_View).  
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Our research draws from two streams of literature. We begin by reviewing the literature on 
overconfidence and how it has evolved in the corporate finance literature.4  We then briefly 
discuss the accounting literature on voluntary earnings forecasts, followed by our specific 
hypotheses. 
 
Overconfidence 
As noted previously, the psychology literature shows that overconfidence manifests itself in 
decision making under uncertainty as both over-optimism and miscalibration. Research in finance 
uses both dimensions, either explicitly or implicitly, to generate predictions about the effect of 
individual overconfidence on economic decisions. Skala (2008) notes that these two dimensions 
are often comingled and simply referred to as ‘overconfidence’ in the finance literature.  
One early example of research linking overconfidence to corporate decision making is 
Roll (1986), who claims that managerial hubris is at least as descriptive as alternative hypotheses 
such as taxes, synergy and inefficient target management, as an explanation for corporate 
takeovers. Camerer and Lovallo (1999) use an experimental setting to show that overconfidence 
affects the decision to enter into a business market where success depends on the individual’s 
skill.5  Heaton (2002) develops a simple theoretical model that assumes managerial optimism and 
predicts that optimistic managers will have upwardly-biased cash flow forecasts, exhibit a 
preference for internal financing of projects because of the perceived undervaluation of the firm, 
and have a stronger resistance to external takeovers.  
Malmendier and Tate (2005) introduce an archival measure of overconfidence that 
classifies managers as overconfident if they exercise options later than the optimal date, hold their 
                                                 
4 The notion of investor overconfidence has also been used extensively in the asset pricing 
literature in finance and accounting. We do not review these studies here. 
5 Interestingly, the degree of over-entry into a market is even stronger when individuals are 
allowed to self-select into the experimental group where the payoffs are skill-dependent. 
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options until expiration, or increase their holdings of company stock. Using these measures of 
overconfidence, they show that overconfident CEOs of 477 large U.S. companies between 1980 
and 1994 have a heightened sensitivity of corporate investment to cash flow. They attribute this 
finding to the fact that overconfident CEOs are more likely to overestimate the returns of 
investment projects, and invest more when internal funds are sufficient. Employing the same 
measure, Malmendier and Tate (2008) find that overconfident CEOs are also more acquisitive and 
engage in more value-destroying mergers because they overestimate their ability to generate 
returns. Although Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) use proprietary data, changes to the data 
collected by Execucomp allows this measure to be computed for a broad sample of firms starting 
in 2006.  
One concern with the option-based measure is the potential endogeneity in a model that 
links the CEO’s equity holdings to his/her corporate decisions, and the possibility of omitted 
variables. Malmendier and Tate (2008) therefore construct a second measure of overconfidence 
based on outsiders’ perceptions of the CEO, using popular press characterizations. They argue the 
press-based measure of overconfidence is less likely to suffer from the same endogeneity concerns 
as the equity-based measure of overconfidence. Specifically, it is more difficult to argue that the 
manner in which a CEO is described in the press subsequently alters his/her behavior in a manner 
consistent with the description (e.g. describing a CEO as aggressive causes him/her to make more 
aggressive decisions). A disadvantage of this measure is that it is likely to be a noisy instrument, 
measuring the true degree of CEO confidence with a significant amount of error. Moreover, the 
extent to which CEOs receive press coverage varies substantially and this measure can only be 
constructed in firms where there is likely to be substantial press coverage of the CEO.6 
                                                 
6 A third measure of overconfidence is used by Ben-David et al. (2013). They survey CFOs and 
measure the confidence bounds that they provide when asked to estimate the future performance 
of a stock index. Overconfidence is then defined as setting confidence intervals too narrowly 
relative to the historical variance of the stock index, thereby focusing on miscalibration. This 
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Hirshleifer et al. (2012) use both the option-based and press-based measures in their 
study of the effects of overconfidence on investments in risky projects. While both measures 
provide results consistent with their hypothesis that overconfident CEOs invest more in R&D, 
apply for more patents, and enjoy more innovative success, they argue that the press-based 
measure is more stringent and less likely to proxy for inside information. Although they use 
similar measures to Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008), Hirshleifer et al. (2012) derive their 
predictions from the miscalibration facet of overconfidence, whereas Malmendier and Tate (2005, 
2008) derive their predictions from the over-optimism facet.   
Note that the studies discussed above are motivated from both the optimism and 
miscalibration dimensions of overconfidence, although most refer to the construct as 
‘overconfidence’ (e.g. Malmendier and Tate 2005, 2008; Jin and Kothari 2008; Hirshleifer et al. 
2012; Ben-David et al. 2013). To operationalize overconfidence, we use the first two measures 
discussed above, option-based and press-based, which can be computed from publicly available 
data. We rely on both the optimism and miscalibration effects to generate predictions about 
management forecasting, despite the fact that the empirical measures of overconfidence do not 
distinguish between these dimensions. Thus, our hypotheses assume that the empirical measures 
capture some of each dimension. For example, the decision of a CEO to hold in-the-money 
options could be related to an over-optimistic outlook for future stock returns, as well as a belief 
that the distribution of expected future stock price is less variable than it really is. Similarly, 
individuals described as overconfident in the popular press could reflect either of these dimensions. 
In contrast to much prior research, we distinguish whether each hypothesis stems from optimism 
or miscalibration.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
measure has the advantage of directly measuring the construct of interest and is more consistent 
with experimental studies that measure overconfidence using psychometric tests. The downside is 
that the measure is proprietary and only exists for a self-selected set of managers.  
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Hypothesis development  
Prior research suggests a number of incentives for why firms voluntarily issue forecasts. Skinner 
(1994) argues that one reason firms issue forecasts is the preemptive dissemination of bad news, 
thereby fending off litigation. Matsumoto (2002) and Cotter, Tuna, and Wysocki (2006) suggest 
that firms use guidance to guide analysts’ forecasts downward to avoid a negative earnings 
surprise. Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) hypothesize and find that managers with more stock-
based incentives issue more frequent forecasts to avoid equity mispricing, as it could adversely 
affect their personal wealth. Ajinkya, Bjojraj, and Sengupta (2005) study the effect of corporate 
governance mechanisms on forecast properties and find that firms with greater institutional 
ownership and outsider directors are more likely to provide forecasts. Their forecasts are also less 
optimistically biased and more precise.  
More generally, the literature on management forecasts has demonstrated a number of 
different economic incentives to issue forecasts as well as the constraints on forecast optimism. A 
recent study by Bamber, Jiang, and Wang (2010) follows managers across firms and finds that 
managers exhibit individual-specific styles in their forecasts. Our study differs from theirs in that 
we use an identifiable individual trait (overconfidence) to generate directional predictions about its 
effect on voluntary disclosure decisions.  
Our first prediction relates to the likelihood of issuing a forecast. We predict that CEO 
overconfidence will be positively associated with the decision to issue forecasts because of both 
optimism and miscalibration.7 Optimism increases the expectation of future performance, which 
increases the willingness to commit to performance by issuing a forecast (Libby and Rennekamp 
2012). Additionally, the miscalibration effect suggests that overconfident individuals 
                                                 
7 Technically, ‘dispositional optimism’ is over-optimism stemming from a stable, individual trait, 
and is the component of over-optimism that we are interested in studying. However, optimism can 
also stem from environmental factors that temporarily increase one’s optimism. For brevity, we 
use the term optimism throughout.  
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underestimate the variance of uncertain outcomes, increasing their confidence in the ability to 
predict future performance and a willingness to commit by providing a voluntary forecast. In 
support of these assertions, Libby and Rennekamp (2012) provide evidence that both dimensions 
contribute to the likelihood of forecasting using experimental and survey research methods.8  In 
their experimental task, they separately measure optimism and miscalibration using psychometric 
tests. They find that both aspects of overconfidence affect subjects’ willingness to commit, their 
proxy for forecasting. Moreover, these stable effects are incremental to the self-serving attribution 
that is manipulated in the experiment. Our first hypothesis is essentially an archival counterpart to 
the experimental and survey evidence in Libby and Rennekamp (2012), and is as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS 1(forecast issuance). Overconfidence is positively associated 
with the likelihood of issuing a management earnings forecast.  
 
Our second hypothesis is generated primarily from the dispositional optimism aspect of 
overconfidence. We expect that overconfidence will be positively associated with the likelihood of 
issuing upwardly biased (i.e. overly-optimistic) earnings forecasts, leading overconfident CEOs to 
miss their voluntary earnings forecasts more frequently. This is consistent with the interpretation 
of overconfidence used by Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) and Jin and Kothari (2008), where 
it affects one’s assessment of their acumen relative to the average. Overconfident managers are 
more likely to issue an overly optimistic forecast because they are generally more optimistic about 
the future of the firm, and also overestimate their ability to influence earnings and underestimate 
the probability of unexpected events, such as fluctuations in the business cycle. This leads to our 
second hypothesis, in alternative form:   
                                                 
8 In contrast to the studies mentioned above that treat overconfidence as a stable trait, Hilary and 
Hsu (2011) examine the effects of dynamic overconfidence from self-attribution. 
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HYPOTHESIS 2(optimism). Conditional on issuing a forecast, overconfidence 
is positively associated with the amount of optimism embedded in 
management forecasts.  
 
Our third hypothesis is generated from the miscalibration aspect of overconfidence. If 
miscalibration leads managers to underestimate the variance of random events, then overconfident 
managers will believe they can forecast the future with greater precision. We expect this will 
manifest itself in the precision of their range forecasts. Specifically, we expect that overconfident 
managers will issue forecasts with narrower ranges, conditional on issuing a range forecast. This 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 3 (precision). Conditional on issuing a range forecast, 
overconfidence is negatively associated with the width of the range. 
 
3. Research design 
Sample selection and variable definitions 
Our option-based sample consists of 2,179 U.S. firms, 3,305 CEOs, and 13,120 firm-years. 
Following recent studies (Campbell et al. 2011; Malmendier et al. 2011; Hirshleifer et al. 2012), 
we use year-by-year aggregate data on CEO vested option holdings available in Execucomp from 
2001 to 2010. Conf (Holder67) is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO holds vested options 
with average moneyness of 67% or more at least twice during the sample period, starting in the 
first year the CEO displays this behavior. Average moneyness is calculated as follows. We first 
estimate the realizable value per option as the total realizable value of options divided by the 
number of exercisable options. The average exercise price is estimated as the difference between 
the year-end stock price and the realizable value per option. The average moneyness of options is 
then calculated as the realizable value per option divided by the average exercise price. Once a 
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CEO is identified as overconfident using this measure, he/she remains so during the rest of the 
sample period.  
As an alternative to the option-based measure, our second approach relies on press 
portrayals of the CEO. This sample consists of 607 Fortune 500 firms, 907 CEOs, and 3,298 firm-
years from 2001 to 2007. We collect press coverage information on CEOs of these firms for our 
sample period and employ a financial press-based measure of CEO overconfidence. We search for 
articles referring to the CEOs in the New York Times, Business Week, Financial Times, the 
Economist, Forbes, Fortune, Time, and the Wall Street Journal using Factiva. We record four 
statistics for each CEO in our sample: the number of articles describing the CEO using the terms 
“confident” or “confidence” (Confident); the number of articles describing the CEO using the 
terms “optimistic” or “optimism” (Optimistic); the number of articles describing the CEO using 
the terms “reliable”, “steady”, “practical”, “conservative”, “frugal”, or “cautious” (Cautious); and 
the number of articles describing the CEO using the terms “not confident” or “not optimistic” (Not 
Confident).9  SumTotal is the number of articles in which the CEO is mentioned during the entire 
sample period. We read each article to verify that the word is used in an appropriate context and 
relevant to the CEO of interest.  
We develop our press-based variable of CEO-specific overconfidence using these article 
counts. Conf (Press) is a continuous variable that captures the frequency with which a CEO is 
described as confident or optimistic relative to conservative or not optimistic, and is computed as 
follows: 
Conf (Press) = [(Confident + Optimistic) – (Cautious + Not Confident)] /SumTotal     
                                                 
9 In construction of the press-based measure, we closely follow Malmendier and Tate (2008) and 
Hirshleifer et al. (2012) and combine the number of “optimistic/optimism” and 
“confident/confidence” mentions in a summary measure. In untabulated analyses, we obtain 
qualitatively similar results when we test for the effect of optimism (miscalibration) using only the 
number of optimistic/optimism (confident/confidence) mentions.      
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Confident, Optimistic, Cautious, Not Confident, and SumTotal are article counts for the entire 
sample period and, thus are CEO-specific. The measure ranges from -1 to 1. Observations for 
which there are no press mentions describing the CEO as confident or conservative in a given year 
are assigned a value of 0 and tend to fall in the middle of the distribution. Unlike Conf (Holder67), 
which categorizes CEOs into discrete groups of overconfident and not overconfident, we focus on 
the continuous Conf (Press) measure, primarily because we believe there is information in the 
relative frequency with which a CEO is referred to as confident.10 Additionally, Conf (Press) does 
a better job of neutralizing the CEOs with no press coverage because they fall in the middle of the 
distribution instead of being grouped with the non-overconfident group.11 
Table 1 provides the distribution of our overconfidence measures. In panel A, we show 
that the percentage of CEOs classified as overconfident ranges from 36 to 51 percent each year for 
Conf (Holder67). The frequency of overconfident CEOs is similar to Malmendier et al. (2011), 
who report an average of 49% in their online Appendix for their sample period from 1992 to 2007. 
Panel B reports the mean of Conf (Press) from 2001 to 2007. Panel C reports a comparison of the 
two measures for the sub-sample of CEO-years with overlapping data. We split Conf (Press) at the 
median and find that 15% (38%) of the sub-sample of CEO-years are classified as (not) 
overconfident by both measures. Hirshleifer et al. (2012) find that both measures classify the CEO 
                                                 
10 For example, if CEO X had 10 overconfident mentions and zero conservative mentions, and 
CEO Y had 4 overconfident mentions and 3 conservative mentions, a binary overconfidence 
measure would assign both CEOs a value of 1, whereas CONF would assign CEO X a value of 1, 
and CEO Y a value of 0.14. 
11 To address the possible concern that CEOs with no press coverage are fundamentally different, 
we also conduct our analyses using a sample that eliminates all CEOs with zero press coverage in 
year t. Although this reduces the number of observations, it alleviates the concern that the press is 
likely to feature a CEO when there is something to discuss, leading to an overrepresentation of 
CEOs with no press coverage in the non-overconfident group. The untabulated results suggest that 
our inferences remain unchanged when we restrict our sample to firm-years with no press 
coverage. 
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as overconfident for 6% of their subsample of CEO-years with overlapping data.12 The 
(untabulated) pair-wise correlation between Conf (Press) and Conf (Holder67) is 0.04 (p<0.05) for 
this sub-sample, compared to 0.05 (p<0.01) reported in Malmendier and Tate (2008) panel B of 
Table 8.     
[TABLE 1] 
To provide evidence on management forecasting behavior, we combine the CEO data 
with a sample of quantitative annual management EPS forecasts reported in the Company Issued 
Guidelines File (CIG) maintained by First Call.13 We obtain actual earnings from the First Call 
Actuals File to ensure consistency between management forecasts and EPS realizations. We 
exclude qualitative forecasts from our sample because we have no objective criterion for 
determining whether such forecasts were missed. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on 
management forecasts for the two samples. For the option-based sample, there are 28,211 
management forecasts during the 2001 to 2010 sample period. The frequency of point, range, and 
open-ended forecasts are 11.5%, 85.59%, and 2.91%, respectively. For the press-based sample, 
there are 7,822 management forecasts during the 2001 to 2007 sample period. The forecasts are 
evenly distributed with a slightly lower level in the first year. The frequency of point, range, and 
open-ended forecasts are 13.56%, 81.96%, and 4.47%, respectively. The lower frequency of point 
forecasts in the option-based sample is likely due to firms providing less specific forecasts in 
2008-2010.  
[TABLE 2] 
                                                 
12 Hirshleifer et al. (2012) also report that 3% of the CEO-years are classified as overconfident by 
the press-based measure while the option-based measure indicates otherwise. They do not report 
the percentage of CEO-years classified as not overconfident using both measures, or the 
percentage of CEO-years classified as overconfident by the option-based measure, but not the 
press-based measure. 
13 We restrict our analyses to annual forecasts because optimism is more likely to manifest itself 
when earnings are most uncertain. Therefore, we expect the effect of overconfidence to have a 
limited effect in the context of quarterly forecasting, where managers are likely to receive more 
frequent and timely feedback.  
17 
 
 
 
To examine the effect of overconfidence on management forecasts, we define the forecast 
properties as follow. Issue is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm issued at least one forecast 
in year t, and zero otherwise. Miss is an indicator variable that is set to 1 if a manager misses their 
own earnings forecast for the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. For open-ended and point estimates, 
the forecast is coded as Miss=1 if the actual EPS is less than the estimated EPS, and zero 
otherwise. For range estimates, the forecast is coded as Miss=1 if the actual EPS is less than the 
lower bound of the range forecast.14 We also examine whether forecast optimism increases with 
overconfidence. We construct a continuous variable, OptBias, defined as the management forecast 
minus actual earnings, scaled by logged assets per share. To test the third hypothesis on forecast 
precision, we use only range forecasts and define Range as the difference between the upper and 
lower bound of the range forecast, scaled by logged assets per share. We include several control 
variables in our analyses, which we describe in the relevant sections. We collect data on firm 
characteristics from Compustat, data on analyst following from IBES, and data on institutional 
holdings from Thomson Financial. A detailed summary of the variable definitions is provided in 
the Appendix.  
Table 3 reports summary statistics for the two alternative samples. The likelihood of 
forecast issuance is 0.49 for the option-based sample and 0.59 for the press-based sample, while 
the likelihood of a missed forecast is similar between the two. The optimistic bias in the forecasts 
is also similar, while firms in the press-based sample issue forecasts with a wider range. In terms 
of firm characteristics, firms in the press-based sample appear to be larger, as measured by the 
number of analysts following and total assets. 
[TABLE 3] 
 
4. Empirical results 
                                                 
14 In untabulated analyses, we also use the mid-point for range forecasts and find similar results.  
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Is overconfidence associated with issuing voluntary forecasts? 
Our first hypothesis relates to whether overconfident CEOs are more likely to issue forecasts. This 
question is important for two reasons. First, we are interested in learning whether overconfidence 
increases the likelihood that a manager will decide to issue a forecast in the first place. Second, 
our later tests examining optimism and forecast form use only the firms that issue forecasts. We 
therefore have a censored dependent variable, in that we observe forecast errors only for CEOs 
who make the decision to forecast. Because the set of firms that provide voluntary forecasts of 
earnings are a self-selected sample that might be affected by overconfidence, we need to control 
for the possible self-selection bias where we only examine CEOs that forecast (e.g. Heckman 
1979).15 We therefore use the forecast prediction model as the first stage in a two-stage Heckman 
procedure to try to remove any potential bias. 
We model the forecast decision as a function of several factors that have been associated 
with the voluntary disclosure decision. The logit models predicting the likelihood of a forecast are: 
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(1b) 
The coefficients on overconfidence (Conf) are used to test our first hypothesis that overconfident 
CEOs are more likely to voluntarily forecast.  
                                                 
15 To the extent that the determinants of the forecast decision are potential determinants of the 
forecast error, ordinary least squares estimates of the parameters in the forecast error equation will 
be biased (Maddala 1983, 222).  
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To control for endogeneity we need to identify a variable that predicts forecast issuance, 
but is not a determinant of forecast optimism and forecast precision (Larcker and Rusticus, 2008). 
Following Feng, Li, and McVay (2009), we use the natural log of the number of analysts 
following the firm (LnAnalysts) as the variable that is included in the forecast issuance model, but 
not included in the second stage models for forecast optimism and forecast precision. Prior 
research has shown that analyst following influences disclosure and the decision to forecast (e.g. 
Lang and Lundholm 1996; Feng et al. 2009), but is not associated with forecast accuracy (Ajinkya 
et al. 2005; Feng et al. 2009). We include firm size (Size), because prior research finds a positive 
association between disclosure and size (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Bhojraj, Libby, and Yang 
2010). We control for the level of institutional ownership (Inst), as prior research suggests that 
firms with greater institutional ownership are more likely to provide management forecasts and 
that their forecasts are also more accurate and precise (Ajinkya et al. 2005). We include earnings 
volatility (EarnVol), as Waymire (1985) finds that firms with more volatile earnings are less likely 
to provide forecasts due to higher inherent uncertainty. We include a control for litigation risk 
(LitRisk) using the coefficient estimates obtained in Rogers and Stocken (2005). 16 Litigation fears 
are likely to reduce firms’ incentives to provide forecasts that are made in good faith.17 Finally, 
Weakness is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm disclosed a material weakness during 
our sample period. Feng et al. (2009) find that firms with material internal control weaknesses are 
                                                 
16 The argument that firms issue preannouncements to preempt litigation is less likely to apply in 
our setting because 1) earnings preannouncements are not included in our sample and 2) such 
disclosures are likely to be quarterly forecasts (Skinner 1994). 
17 Following Rogers and Stocken (2005), LITRISK is estimated from the standard normal 
cumulative distributive function: G(-5.738 + 0.141*Size + 0.284*Turnover + 0.012*Beta - 
0.237*Returns - 1.340*RetVol + 0.011*Skewness - 3.161*Min_Returns + 0.378*Computer 
Hardware + 0.075* Electronics - 0.034*Retailing + 0.211*Computer Software). Turnover is share 
turnover. Beta is market beta. Returns is market returns. RetVol is return volatility. Min_Returns 
is the minimum of daily returns. Skewness is the skewness of daily returns. Computer Hardware, 
Electronics, Retailing, and Computer Software are high litigation risk industry indicators. All 
variables are calculated over the calendar year.            
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more likely to provide forecasts with greater error. Following Feng et al. (2009), we do not have a 
directional prediction on Weakness in our forecast occurrence prediction model.  
We control for return on assets (Roa) because firms with poor performance are less likely 
to provide disclosures (Miller 2002). Market-to-book (MTB) is used to proxy for growth and 
proprietary costs (Bamber and Cheon 1998). Change in earnings (ChgEarn) is defined as change 
in earnings in year t, scaled by year-end price. We control for merger-related activities (M&A) and 
equity offerings (EquityIssue) to the extent that firms may supply more biased information in an 
attempt to reduce information asymmetry when undergoing significant events or accessing capital 
markets. M&A is an indicator variable coded equal to one if the firm’s annual acquisition or 
merger-related costs exceeded 5% of net income (loss) in year t. EquityIssue is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the firm issued additional shares in year t. (1a) uses the option-based 
measures, so we also control for shares owned (ShrOwn) and number of vested options (Vested) 
following Malmendier and Tate (2005). ShrOwn is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by 
the CEO and Vested is the CEO’s total number of vested options over shares outstanding, 
multiplied by 10. (1b) uses the press-based measure, so we control for the total number of press 
mentions (SumTotal) because it has been used as a proxy for CEO reputation (Francis, Huang, 
Rajgopal, and Zang 2008).18    
 The results of estimating the forecast prediction model are presented in Table 4. The first 
column presents results using Conf (Holder67), and we fail to find support that overconfident 
CEOs, as measured by their option-exercising behavior, are more likely to issue forecasts. 
However, the coefficient on Conf (Press) is positive and significant in the second column. A 
coefficient of 2.728 suggests that the likelihood of forecast issuance is 0.455 higher for a one-
standard-deviation increase in Conf (Press). Consistent with our expectations, the coefficient on 
                                                 
18 Following Hirshleifer et al. (2012), we control for industry and year fixed effects in all of our 
specifications. We report p-values based on one-tailed tests for coefficients on the overconfidence 
measures. 
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LnAnalysts is positive and significant, which suggests that firms with more analysts following are 
more likely to provide forecasts. Following Feng et al. (2009), we use this variable as an 
instrument in the second-stage forecast outcome models to control for endogeneity. Previous 
studies suggest that analyst following is a determinant of forecast issuance, but not forecast 
properties, which makes it an ideal candidate as a valid instrument. Taken together, the results in 
Table 4 provide some support for the notion that overconfidence increases the likelihood of 
issuing a forecast, consistent with Libby and Rennekamp (2012).  
[TABLE 4] 
 Because of the significance on overconfidence in the forecast prediction model, we 
construct the Inverse Mills ratio from the prediction models in Table 4 to control for the self-
selection problem in the remaining regressions (Heckman 1979). The Inverse Mills ratio is the 
ratio of the standard normal probability density function to the standard normal cumulative density 
function. We include the Inverse Mills ratio (denoted InvMills) in any specification where the 
sample includes only firms that issue a forecast.  
 
 Is overconfidence associated with issuing optimistic forecasts? 
We test our second hypothesis by estimating the likelihood of missing a forecast as a function of 
CEO overconfidence and other variables that are expected to affect management forecast accuracy 
or bias. Specifically, our logit models are as follows:  
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(2b) 
Miss is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm fails to meet or exceed its earnings 
forecast, and zero otherwise. As before, we control for ShrOwn and VestedOptions for Conf 
(Holder67) and SumTotal for Conf (Press). Excluding the number of analysts, we include the 
same control variables used in the first stage model to capture the likelihood of issuing a forecast. 
However, the predicted sign changes on several variables. For example, although institutional 
ownership increases the likelihood of forecasting, it decreases the likelihood of missing the 
forecast because institutional ownership is associated with greater forecast accuracy. For brevity, 
we do not explain the prediction on every control variable in the second stage regressions, but note 
the predicted sign in the respective table based on results in prior literature (e.g. Bamber and 
Cheon 1998; Ajinkya et al. 2005; Feng et al. 2009; Bhojraj et al. 2010). Additional control 
variables in the second stage regressions include a firm’s discretionary accruals (Dacc) estimated 
from the modified Jones model, since Kasznik (1999) finds that firms are likely to manage 
earnings to avoid missing their own forecast. We also control for forecast horizon (Horizon) and 
news (News) because we expect managers to have less information about realized earnings the 
earlier the forecast is issued and if the news is bad. We also control for industry concentration 
(Conc), as firms in high-concentration industries may issue more pessimistic forecasts when 
investors have difficulty identifying the bias in forecasts (Rogers and Stocken 2005). 
 [TABLE 5] 
Table 5 reports the results of estimating (2a) and (2b). Consistent with our second 
hypothesis, we find evidence that overconfident CEOs are more likely to miss their own forecasts 
using both overconfidence proxies. A coefficient of 0.841 on Conf (Press) suggests that a one-
standard deviation increase in Conf (Press) increases the likelihood of missed forecasts by 0.192. 
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The coefficients on the control variables are also consistent with prior research. We find that 
better-performing firms, as measured by Roa, are less likely to miss their own forecasts while 
firms with losses are more likely to miss their own forecasts. Forecasts issued earlier in the fiscal 
period and good news forecasts are also more likely to be optimistic.  
In Table 6, we provide another test of hypothesis 2 using a continuous measure of 
forecast optimism as the dependent variable, using the following specification: 
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(3b)
 OptBias is defined as the management forecast minus actual earnings, scaled by logged 
assets per share. Therefore, a positive (negative) value indicates management optimism 
(pessimism). Consistent with results in Table 5, Table 6 shows that overconfidence increases 
forecast optimism. The coefficient on Conf (Holder67) implies that an overconfident CEO 
increases forecast optimism by 0.005. On the other hand, the coefficient of 4.177 for Conf (Press) 
is associated with a 0.375 increase in forecast optimism for each one-standard deviation increase 
in Conf (Press). Consistent with the prior literature, we also find that forecast optimism is 
decreasing in earnings volatility and industry concentration. One control variable that runs counter 
to the predicted sign is the litigation risk indicator (LitRisk). Although we expected higher 
litigation risk firms to decrease the optimistic bias in forecasts, our results suggest the opposite. 
Overall, however, our results are consistent with our second hypothesis. 
[TABLE 6] 
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Overconfidence and forecast precision 
Our third hypothesis relates overconfidence to the precision of the management earnings forecast. 
Ben-David et al. (2012) define overconfidence as an overestimation of judgmental precision or 
underestimation of the variance of random processes. This suggests that overconfident managers 
will issue forecasts with a narrower range. We estimate the following models to test this 
hypothesis:
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(4b) 
The dependent variable Range is the width of range forecasts, scaled by logged assets per 
share.19 The results are presented in Table 7. Consistent with our third hypothesis on forecast 
precision, we find a negative and significant coefficient on overconfidence for both measures. The 
coefficient on Conf (Holder67) implies that an overconfident CEO issues forecasts with a range of 
-0.403 narrower than a non-overconfident CEO. As a comparison, a firm with high litigation risk 
or material weaknesses is likely to issue forecasts wider by 0.969 or 1.355, respectively. The 
coefficients on Conf (Press) also suggest that overconfident CEOs issue range forecasts with 
                                                 
19 We also consider the absolute value of the mid-point as an alternative scale factor and find 
similar results. We opt not to use share price as the main scale factor because Conf (Press) is 
highly correlated with market value and would introduce a mechanical and negative relation 
between Conf (Press) and Range and Conf (Press) and OptBias. 
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narrower widths. Overall, these results are consistent with our third hypothesis on overconfidence 
and forecast precision. 
[TABLE 7] 
 
5. Robustness tests and alternative hypotheses 
Alternative measure of overconfidence 
While the evidence thus far using year-to-year aggregate Execucomp data is consistent with our 
hypotheses, we also examine whether our results are robust to using a less noisy proxy for 
overconfidence that replicates the proprietary measures developed by Malmendier and Tate (2005, 
2008). Using detailed package-level CEO portfolio data on Execucomp available beginning in 
2006, we classify CEOs as overconfident if they hold options with five years remaining duration, 
despite a 67% increase in stock price (or more). Once a CEO is identified as overconfident using 
this measure, they remain so during the rest of the sample period. Approximately 35% of 
managers are considered overconfident using this measure, compared with 46% for our main 
measure. The results using Conf (Holder67_MT) are presented in Table 8. Column 1 reports 
results for the test of forecast issuance and, consistent with H1, we find that CEOs classified as 
overconfident using this measure are more likely to issue forecasts. The results for H2 using this 
measure are weaker, where we only find an effect for the likelihood of a missed forecast. 
Consistent with H3, overconfident CEOs are also more likely to provide forecasts with a narrower 
range. Overall, these results suggest that our findings are robust to using a measure that is more 
likely to capture CEO beliefs and less influenced by other systematic factors, as argued in 
Malmendier et al. (2011).  
[TABLE 8] 
 
Signaling private information 
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A concern with the option-based overconfidence proxies is that they are endogenous and possibly 
related to the CEO’s private information about the firm’s prospects. In the context of voluntary 
disclosure, the private information argument would suggest that overconfident managers are more 
likely to use forecasts to communicate their private information to outsiders. Moreover, they should 
also be more likely to issue good news forecasts. However, in untabulated analyses, we do not find 
any evidence that CEOs that hold their options too long are more likely to provide forecasts that 
contain good news. On the other hand, it could also mean that the CEO knows she has high ability 
and is trying to signal her type. However, this is inconsistent with our finding that such CEOs also 
issue forecasts that are more biased. Finally, private information should be time-varying, whereas 
as CEO option-exercising behavior is fairly persistent over time (Malmendier and Tate 2005, 2008; 
Hirshleifer et al. 2012). 
 
6. Conclusion 
Contrary to prior studies that focus on personal or economic incentives, we relax the assumption 
of management rationality to examine the effect of executive overconfidence on management 
earnings forecasts. We provide evidence consistent with the notion that managerial overconfidence 
manifests itself as excessive optimism about future earnings, leading overconfident CEOs to 
voluntary forecast. This has two implications. First, we find that overconfident CEOs are more 
likely to issue and subsequently miss their own forecasts, controlling for other predictors of 
forecast issuance and ex-post forecast accuracy such as forecast horizon, discretionary accruals, 
merger and acquisition activity, and firm performance. Second, we show that overconfidence is 
associated with forecast precision, with overconfident CEOs issuing narrower range forecasts.  
Our study therefore contributes to our understanding of why managers miss their own 
forecasts when the costs of failing to meet their own earnings expectations are so high. Given that 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) find that the market discounts mergers undertaken by overconfident 
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CEOs, future research in this topic could also investigate whether investors or analysts take 
managerial overconfidence into consideration when determining a firm’s stock price based on its 
forecasts.   
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Appendix  
Overconfidence measures 
Conf (Holder67) Conf (Holder67) is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO holds options 
despite a 67% increase in stock price (or more) at least twice, beginning in 
the first year the CEO exhibits this behavior. 
Conf (Press) Conf (Press) is a fixed measure of CEO confidence defined as the number 
of articles describing the CEO as optimistic or confident minus the number 
of articles describing the CEO as reliable, steady, practical, conservative, 
frugal, cautious, not optimistic, or not confident, scaled by the number of 
CEO press mentions. 
Forecast outcome variables 
Issue Issue equals one if the firm issued at least one forecast in year t, and zero 
otherwise. 
Miss Miss equals one if actual earnings is less than the management forecast, and 
zero otherwise. For range forecasts, Miss=1 if actual earnings is less than 
the lower bound of the range estimate. 
OptBias Bias is defined as the management forecast minus earnings, scaled by 
logged assets per share. 
Range Range is forecast range, scaled by logged assets per share. 
Control variables  
LnAnalysts LnAnalysts is the natural log of the number of analysts following in year t. 
Inst Inst is percentage of institutional holdings in year t. 
Size Size is the natural log of the firm’s assets in year t.   
EarnVol Earnings volatility is the standard deviation of income before extraordinary 
items scaled by assets over five years ending in year t. 
LitRisk LitRisk is the probability of litigation estimated using the probit model in 
Rogers and Stocken (2005). 
ChgEarn ChgEarn is the change in earnings in year t, scaled by year-end price. 
MTB MTB is market-to-book in year t. 
EquityIssue EquityIssue is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm issued shares in 
year t. 
M&A M&A equals one if the firm’s annual acquisition or merger-related costs 
exceeded 5% of net income (loss) in year t, and zero otherwise. 
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Weak Weak equals one if the firm reported a material weakness during the sample 
period, and zero otherwise. 
Roa Roa is return on assets in year t. 
Loss Loss equals one if the firm reported loss in year t, and zero otherwise. 
ShrOwn ShrOwn is the percentage of shares outstanding owned by the CEO in year 
t. 
Vested Vested is the CEO’s holdings of unexercised exercisable options over total 
shares outstanding in year t, multiplied by 10. 
SumTotal SumTotal is the sum of CEO press mentions over the entire sample period. 
Horizon Horizon is the number of days between forecast issuance and fiscal year 
end. 
News News is the management forecast minus prevailing analysts’ consensus, 
scaled by logged assets per share. 
Dacc Dacc is discretionary accruals in year t estimated from the modified Jones 
model. 
Conc Conc is the industry concentration ratio and measured as the sum of 
revenue for the top five firms in its two-digit SIC code, scaled by sum of all 
firms in its two-digit SIC code.  
InvMills InvMills is the Inverse Mill’s ratio estimated from the first stage of the 
Heckman model. 
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TABLE 1 
Frequency of overconfident CEOs  
Panel A: Option-based measure sample 
Conf (Holder67) 
Year CEOs (#) 
Overconfident 
CEOs (#) Overconfident CEOs (%) 
2001 1,052 378 35.93% 
2002 1,100 425 38.64% 
2003 1,197 502 41.94% 
2004 1,248 598 47.92% 
2005 1,268 645 50.87% 
2006 1,312 665 50.69% 
2007 1,400 692 49.43% 
2008 1,499 673 44.90% 
2009 1,514 647 42.73% 
2010 1,530 655 42.81% 
  13,120     
Panel B: Press-based measure sample  
Conf (Press) 
Year CEOs (#) 
Overconfidence 
Mean Overconfidence Std Dev 
2001 468 0.019 0.086 
2002 465 0.020 0.093 
2003 471 0.018 0.074 
2004 474 0.013 0.070 
2005 475 0.015 0.074 
2006 476 0.013 0.088 
2007 469 0.012 0.080 
  3,298     
  
Panel C: Comparison of Conf (Holder67) and Conf (Press) 
 Conf (Holder67)=0 Conf (Holder67)=1  
Conf (Press)=<0 896 (38%) 569 (24%) 1,465 (62%) 
Conf (Press)>0 552 (23%) 349 (15%) 901 (38%) 
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 1,448 (61%) 918 (39%) 2,366 (100%) 
This table provides the distribution of the overconfidence measures by year. Panel A presents the 
distribution of the number of CEOs, the number of overconfident CEOs, and the percentage of 
overconfident CEOs for the option-based measure. Panel B presents the number of CEOs and the 
mean and standard deviation of the press-based measure. Panel C presents a comparison of the 
overconfidence measures for a sub-sample of CEO-years with data available for both measures. 
Conf (Holder67) is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO holds options despite a 67% 
increase in stock price (or more) at least twice. Conf (Press) is defined as the number of articles 
describing the CEO as optimistic or confident minus the number of articles describing the CEO as 
reliable, steady, practical, conservative, frugal, cautious, not optimistic, or not confident, scaled by 
the number of CEO press mentions over the entire sample period.   
36 
 
 
 
TABLE 2  
Descriptive statistics for sample of management forecasts 
Panel A: Option-based measure sample 
Year Forecasts (#) 
Forecasts 
(%) Type 
Forecasts 
(#) Forecasts (%)
2001 1,605 5.69% Point 3,245 11.50% 
2002 2,184 7.74% Range 24,145 85.59% 
2003 2,483 8.80% 
Open-
ended 821 2.91% 
2004 2,909 10.31% 28,211 
2005 2,896 10.27%
2006 3,238 11.48%
2007 3,341 11.84%
2008 3,604 12.78%
2009 2,885 10.23%
2010 3,066 10.87%
  28,211         
Panel B: Press-based measure sample 
Year Forecasts (#) 
Forecasts 
(%) Type
Forecasts 
(#) Forecasts (%)
2001 713 9.12% Point 1,061 13.56% 
2002 1,004 12.84% Range 6,411 81.96% 
2003 1,120 14.32%
Open-
ended 350 4.47% 
2004 1,251 15.99% 7,822 
2005 1,216 15.55%
2006 1,299 16.61%
2007 1,219 15.58%
  7,822         
 
This table provides the distribution of management forecasts by year. Panel A presents the 
frequency of and the type of forecasts by year for the sample using the option-based measure. 
Panel B presents the frequency of and the type of forecasts by year for the sample using the press-
based measure. Forecast type is the type of forecast issued including point, range, and open-ended 
forecasts. 
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TABLE 3 
Summary statistics 
Option-based measure 
sample Press-based measure sample
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev 
Conf (Holder67) 0.46 0.00 0.50 Conf (Press) 0.02 0.00 0.09 
Issue 0.49 1.00 0.50 Issue 0.59 1.00 0.49 
Miss 0.42 0.00 0.49 Miss 0.45 0.00 0.50 
OptBias 0.01 0.00 0.12 OptBias 0.01 0.05 0.62 
Range 2.62 0.90 5.66 Range 4.97 2.63 8.43 
LnAnalysts 2.19 2.30 0.71 LnAnalysts 2.59 2.67 0.50 
Inst 0.80 0.82 0.22 Inst 0.70 0.72 0.19 
Size 7.9 7.89 2.35 Size 9.46 9.37 1.25 
EarnVol 0.51 0.02 4.62 EarnVol 0.02 0.02 0.03 
LitRisk 0.05 0.01 0.31 LitRisk 0.03 0.01 0.19 
ChgEarn 1.65 0.39 19.09 ChgEarn 0.14 0.03 2.80 
MTB 71.02 2.30 813.20 MTB 2.96 2.54 7.77 
EquityIssue 0.61 1.00 0.49 EquityIssue 0.57 1.00 0.49 
M&A 0.01 0.00 0.10 M&A 0.00 0.00 0.05 
Weakness 0.12 0.00 0.33 Weakness 0.10 0.00 0.29 
Roa 0.29 0.05 4.01 Roa 0.06 0.05 0.07 
Loss 0.10 0.00 0.30 Loss 0.05 0.00 0.22 
ShrOwn 0.85 0.00 2.57 SumTotal 59.69 17.00 140.94 
Vested 7.76 4.64 9.31 Horizon 382.20 343.00 131.44 
Horizon 219.71 235.00 133.04 News 1.00 -0.55 23.90 
News -9.33 -1.63 11.42 Dacc 0.00 0.00 0.04 
Dacc 0.00 0.00 0.07 Conc 0.11 0.00 0.32 
Conc 0.41 0.37 0.17 
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TABLE 4  
First-stage estimation of the probability of management forecast issuance 
  
Predicted sign 
Dependent variable = Issue 
Conf (Holder67) Conf (Press) 
Conf + 0.002 2.728*** 
(0.043) (0.635) 
LnAnalysts + 0.297*** 0.106*** 
(0.033) (0.007) 
Inst + 0.357*** 0.397 
(0.114) (0.265) 
Size + 0.064*** -0.195*** 
(0.011) (0.046) 
EarnVol - -0.015*** -8.577*** 
(0.004) (1.745) 
LitRisk - 0.042 0.840 
(0.059) (0.555) 
ChgEarn - -0.006*** -0.023* 
(0.001) (0.014) 
MTB + 0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.006) 
EquityIssue ? -0.145*** 0.068 
(0.043) (0.102) 
M&A ? 0.304 -1.257 
(0.189) (0.770) 
Weak ? 0.058 0.581*** 
(0.061) (0.172) 
Roa - -0.004 -0.835** 
(0.005) (0.425) 
Loss - -1.064*** -0.641*** 
(0.065) (0.182) 
ShrOwn ? -0.025*** 
(0.009) 
Vested ? 0.011*** 
(0.002) 
SumTotal ? -0.002*** 
(0.000) 
Pseudo Rsq 0.171 0.183 
Observations   13,120 3,298 
This table presents results from logit regressions of forecast issuance on overconfidence. Issue is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the firm issued at least one forecast in year t, zero otherwise. Conf 
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(Holder67) is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO holds options despite a 67% increase in 
stock price (or more) at least twice. Conf (Press) is defined as the number of articles describing the 
CEO as optimistic or confident minus the number of articles describing the CEO as reliable, 
steady, practical, conservative, frugal, cautious, not optimistic, or not confident, scaled by the 
number of CEO press mentions over the entire sample period. See Appendix for variable 
definitions. Industry and year fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 significance levels, respectively.   
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TABLE 5  
Second-stage estimation of the probability of missed forecasts  
Predicted sign Dependent variable = Miss 
Conf (Holder67) Conf (Press) 
Conf + 0.178*** 0.841* 
(0.030) (0.537) 
Inst - 0.100 -1.838*** 
(0.077) (0.194) 
Size - -0.038*** -0.092** 
(0.009) (0.038) 
EarnVol - -0.022*** -1.619 
(0.005) (1.659) 
LitRisk - 0.601*** -0.005 
(0.168) (0.267) 
ChgEarn - -0.008*** -0.029 
(0.001) (0.019) 
MTB - -0.000 -0.011*** 
(0.000) (0.003) 
EquityIssue - -0.067*** 0.374*** 
(0.033) (0.064) 
M&A - 0.228 -2.337** 
(0.162) (1.127) 
Weak ? 0.124*** 0.365*** 
(0.043) (0.100) 
Roa - -0.016*** -1.647** 
(0.004) (0.697) 
Loss + 0.503*** -0.036 
(0.068) (0.202) 
Horizon + 0.003*** 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) 
News + 0.005*** 0.019*** 
(0.002) (0.003) 
Dacc - 0.371 -0.933 
(0.263) (0.902) 
Conc - -1.374*** 0.286*** 
(0.508) (0.104) 
InvMills ? 0.710*** 0.233* 
(0.160) (0.140) 
Pseudo Rsq 0.124 0.126 
Observations 28,211 7,822 
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This table presents results from logit regressions of optimistic forecasts on overconfidence. Miss is 
a dummy variable equal to one if actual earnings is less than the management forecast, zero 
otherwise. Conf (Holder67) is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO holds options despite a 
67% increase in stock price (or more) at least twice. Conf (Press) is defined as the number of 
articles describing the CEO as optimistic or confident minus the number of articles describing the 
CEO as reliable, steady, practical, conservative, frugal, cautious, not optimistic, or not confident, 
scaled by the number of CEO press mentions over the entire sample period. See Appendix for 
variable definitions. ShrOwn, Vested, SumTotal, and industry and year fixed effects are included 
but untabulated. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 significance levels, respectively.  
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TABLE 6  
Overconfidence and management forecast bias  
Predicted sign Dependent variable = OptBias 
Conf (Holder67) Conf (Press) 
Conf + 0.005*** 4.177* 
(0.002) (2.763) 
Inst - -0.009* 3.255** 
(0.005) (1.429) 
Size - 0.004*** -0.779* 
(0.001) (0.404) 
EarnVol - -0.001*** -3.857** 
(0.000) (2.842) 
LitRisk - 0.045*** 7.293** 
(0.008) (3.534) 
ChgEarn - -0.000*** -0.119 
(0.000) (0.307) 
MTB - -0.000 0.048** 
(0.000) (0.020) 
EquityIssue - -0.014*** 0.313 
(0.002) (0.457) 
M&A - -0.045*** -1.640 
(0.011) (2.103) 
Weak ? 0.011*** 4.943*** 
(0.002) (1.060) 
Roa - -0.000 7.713 
(0.000) (5.078) 
Loss + 0.055*** 4.229** 
(0.008) (1.998) 
Horizon + 0.000*** 0.006* 
(0.000) (0.003) 
News + 0.001*** 0.420*** 
(0.000) (0.038) 
Dacc - -0.027 -21.901* 
(0.019) (13.169) 
Conc - -0.096*** -0.298 
(0.034) (0.568) 
InvMills ? 0.134*** 2.596** 
(0.022) (1.058) 
Pseudo Rsq 0.116 0.270 
Observations 28,211 7,822 
This table presents results from OLS egressions of forecast optimism on overconfidence. OptBias 
is defined as the management forecast minus actual earnings, scaled by logged assets per share. 
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Conf (Holder67) is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO holds options despite a 67% 
increase in stock price (or more) at least twice. Conf (Press) is defined as the number of articles 
describing the CEO as optimistic or confident minus the number of articles describing the CEO as 
reliable, steady, practical, conservative, frugal, cautious, not optimistic, or not confident, scaled by 
the number of CEO press mentions over the entire sample period. See Appendix for variable 
definitions. ShrOwn, Vested, SumTotal, and industry and year fixed effects are included but 
untabulated. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 significance levels, respectively.  
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TABLE 7  
Overconfidence and management forecast precision  
Predicted sign Dependent variable = Range 
Conf (Holder67) Conf (Press) 
Conf - -0.403*** -1.539* 
(0.061) (1.001) 
Inst - -1.465*** -0.066 
(0.210) (0.562) 
Size + 2.427*** 2.800*** 
(0.069) (0.149) 
EarnVol + -0.060*** 32.863*** 
(0.008) (4.865) 
LitRisk ? 0.969*** -6.384*** 
(0.131) (2.162) 
ChgEarn - -0.010* -0.193** 
(0.006) (0.089) 
MTB - -0.000** -0.023 
(0.000) (0.017) 
EquityIssue ? -0.234*** 0.513*** 
(0.080) (0.157) 
M&A ? -1.047*** -0.796 
(0.189) (0.674) 
Weak + 1.355*** 1.534*** 
(0.109) (0.492) 
Roa ? 0.035** 10.988*** 
(0.014) (2.298) 
Loss + 0.744*** -1.981*** 
(0.157) (0.700) 
Horizon + 0.007*** -0.002*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
News + 0.015** 28.630*** 
(0.006) (8.707) 
Dacc + 4.589*** 30.312*** 
(0.810) (8.966) 
Conc - -1.002 2.371*** 
(0.886) (0.803) 
InvMills ? 6.475*** -2.191*** 
(0.727) (0.408) 
Pseudo Rsq 0.437 0.420 
Observations 24,145 6,411 
This table presents results from OLS egressions of forecast precision on overconfidence for range 
forecasts. Range is defined as forecast range, scaled by logged assets per share. Conf (Holder67) is 
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a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO holds options despite a 67% increase in stock price (or 
more) at least twice. Conf (Press) is defined as the number of articles describing the CEO as 
optimistic or confident minus the number of articles describing the CEO as reliable, steady, 
practical, conservative, frugal, cautious, not optimistic, or not confident, scaled by the number of 
CEO press mentions over the entire sample period. See Appendix for variable definitions. ShrOwn, 
Vested, SumTotal, and industry and year fixed effects are included but untabulated. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
significance levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 8  
Alternative measures of overconfidence, 2006-2010 
Dependent 
variable=Issue 
Dependent 
variable=Miss 
Dependent 
variable=OptBias
Dependent 
variable=Range 
Conf (Holder67_MT) 0.452*** 0.104* 0.134 -0.316*** 
(0.083) (0.065) (0.194) (0.073) 
LnAnalysts 0.139** 
(0.067) 
Inst 0.781** -0.651*** 0.893 -3.843*** 
(0.305) (0.225) (0.757) (0.424) 
Size 0.091*** -0.164*** -0.733*** 1.591*** 
(0.030) (0.023) (0.088) (0.043) 
EarnVol -0.134** -0.022 0.175 0.046 
(0.056) (0.083) (0.203) (0.068) 
LitRisk -0.079 1.720*** 12.846*** 0.738** 
(0.233) (0.217) (1.164) (0.293) 
ChgEarn -0.002 -0.007*** -0.062*** -0.005 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.011) (0.004) 
MTB -0.012 -0.053*** -0.094** 0.127*** 
(0.015) (0.011) (0.038) (0.013) 
EquityIssue -0.197** -0.071 -0.196 -0.208*** 
(0.081) (0.064) (0.184) (0.073) 
M&A 0.373 0.076 3.815*** -0.015 
(0.340) (0.249) (1.016) (0.303) 
Weak -0.026 0.054 0.267 0.192** 
(0.114) (0.083) (0.237) (0.097) 
Roa -0.018 -0.078*** -0.553*** 0.009 
(0.026) (0.028) (0.174) (0.062) 
Loss -1.164*** 0.911*** 1.311*** 0.135 
(0.125) (0.125) (0.441) (0.150) 
Horizon 1.371*** 0.660* 2.753*** 
(0.116) (0.377) (0.147) 
News 0.019*** 0.173*** -0.036* 
(0.007) (0.053) (0.020) 
Dacc 1.060* 4.370** -0.469 
(0.641) (1.752) (0.646) 
Conc -5.763*** -31.538*** -10.645*** 
(1.606) (4.875) (2.308) 
InvMills -0.990*** -1.416** 0.956*** 
(0.297) (0.579) (0.261) 
Pseudo Rsq 0.244 0.110 0.182 0.555 
Observations 4,148 8,253 8,253 7,271 
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This table presents results using Execucomp package-level data. The sample consists of 8,253 
forecasts from 2006-2010. Conf (Holder67) is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO holds 
options with five years remaining duration despite a 67% increase in stock price (or more) at least 
twice. See Appendix for variable definitions. ShrOwn, Vested, and industry and year fixed effects 
are included but untabulated. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 significance levels, respectively. 
